In international relations, the level of the nation-state continues to be the main actor that we must take into consideration from now on in the developments in relation to Kosovo and the diplomatic battles to secure its place within the International Community. Foreign policy is the responsibility of national governments. Supranational mechanisms, such as the EU or the Council of Europe, no matter how important they are for political life and relations between nation-states in relations within Western liberal democracies, remain dependent on the political will of national governments.
Formulations of national interests are at the center of this essay and also the result of the views given to me by the School of Realism. In this case, it does not mean that the role of other actors, such as parties, the government, as well as that of the opposition and interest groups and non-governmental organizations, is completely excluded.
Researchers in this field, in their analyzes of German politics and the Kosovo issue, have also used other documents such as: official speeches, government documents – coalition agreements or answers to parliamentary questions, as well as press releases from the federal government.
EU and UN documents related to South-Eastern Europe, with emphasis on Kosovo, were also used in this range.
For an empirical approach, I will refer here to the analyzes and interviews of other researchers on this topic.
National interests
The concept of national interest “is a vague concept, much misused and yet a necessary concept of politics”.[1] But even in the analysis of international politics and foreign policy research, no concrete step can be taken without this term, therefore the misuse of this term is inevitable.
In the following, I am bringing some crucial views on the concept of national interest in the theoretical context of international relations.
My theoretical point of view in this regard is related to the theories of classical realism [2] and neorealism. In both theories, the concept of interest has a central meaning. The starting point of classical realism is the state as the dominant actor in the international system. Other actors play a subordinate role. The state is sovereign, it possesses – if we speak in the language of Max Weber – the monopoly of legitimate physical violence. The concept of interest is closely related to that of power.
Hans J. Morgenthau attempted to use these two terms to explain laws in international relations in order to gain insight into foreign policy action.
Like the theory of classical realism and that of neorealism, National Interests are treated as acts of action in the service of the state’s existence.
The most important interest of states is their security, which seems to be in permanent danger. The reason for this is the international system characterized by anarchy.
A higher authority that regulates the behavior of states and sanctioned by international laws does not exist. This anarchy of the international state system creates permanent uncertainty for states – therefore “war is an ever-present, conditional obligation”.[3] The fact that the fear of war is not universal is due to the existence of a core of practices that produce a minimum of international order: international law, the balance of power, the fear of war itself. (…)
For Morgenthau, realism “does not endow the fundamental concept of interest (…) with meaning that is established once and for all. The current position of France and Italy in relation to Kosovo, best argues this scientific postulate of Morgenthau.
The elections for the European Parliament, the permanent growth of neo-fascist sentiment in the spectrum of the French and Italian right, may have influenced the postponement of Kosovo’s admission to the Council of Europe for a few months, linking all this maneuvering with the elections for the European Parliament, respectively national interests.
Neofascism, as a new political movement based on revised fascist ideologies, is gaining ground in several countries of the European Union. This phenomenon must be watched carefully, as it presents several risks for Albanians living in the EU and for Albanians in our two republics – the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Kosovo, but also for those in North Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkans, affecting social, political and security issues.
For Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Morgenthau’s assistant and founder of Munich School neorealism, the British policy of balance represents an objective foreign policy constellation of interests that determined political action in a given historical period.
This approach considers interests as a subjective category. This is the case with neorealism. Therefore, the national interest of the state is what the politicians put in the responsible decision-making institutions. Interest is no longer determined by temporal objectivity, but by subjective interpretation by the actors involved.
Avoiding possible conflicts based on national interests
In April, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – which is rightly regarded as the most credible institution of pan-European democracy, through the approval of the report of the well-known Greek diplomat Dora Bakoyannis, paved the way for Kosovo’s accession to this organization.
Despite the practices so far, with the insistence of France and Italy, the Council of Europe refused to put on the agenda the issue of recognizing the Republic of Kosovo as the 47th member of this European mechanism.
For some observers, the stance of France and Italy to avoid this act, after insisting that it was “based” on the need to preserve unity within the European Council, respectively the EU, is not only related to the extreme bleeding of Serbian diplomacy, but even with the commitment of its allies within the EU, who do so in the name of national interests. Perhaps in this point of view, the real reasons why the German side will join this grouping should be sought. Germany seems to have been interested in avoiding any possible drama in this clash of national interests within the EU. This fact proved once again that these disputes cannot be resolved in Brussels.
German foreign policy in relation to South-Eastern Europe, and with emphasis on Kosovo, live a parallel life with the “European” one, pretending not to collide them against each other on the international stage. This tension between the independent German foreign policy and the common European foreign policy – between national sovereignty and European interdependence – was the main reason for leaning this time in favor of the France-Italy duo, who were engaging in the name of the supposedly pan-European interest, and to the detriment of Kosovo.
The thesis that “Kosovo failed to complete the process of its membership in the Council of Europe”, predicted to happen on May 17, in the light of geopolitical developments, is not real. This is de facto the second voluntary failure of the EU itself. The first failure was the approval with only eight votes against, of the report of the Swiss senator Dick Marty [2011], in which “claims were made against some of the former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army for involvement in organized crime, including organ trafficking human.” [4]
On November 30, 2020, the Judge of the Preliminary Procedure of the Specialized Chambers of Kosovo made public the decision to confirm the indictment[5] against the former prime minister and president of the Republic and a number of his former close associates, but the accusations of human organ trafficking that was the cause of the pressure for the establishment of the Specialized Chambers of this Court, he said. However, Dik Marti’s report and the accusation itself seriously damage the history of the KLA from its infancy and the modern history of Kosovo in general.
Both of these acts, which were also the result of efforts to maintain and balance the EU’s geopolitical balances with Russia and its allies in Southeast Europe, should be seen simply as a byproduct of Europe’s unsuccessful engagements in the region since the year 1914.
On May 17, 2024, it was noticed that Brussels is not yet prepared to face the challenges that are being brought by the strong return of geopolitics and the imposition by Russia and China in the process of new regroupings on the map of postmodern geopolitics. This failure, if not corrected quickly, could cost Europe a lot in the new realignment during the process of the New European Order, which will follow with the end of the war in Ukraine.
By rejecting Kosovo as a possible new member of the Council of Europe, the EU lost the conventional internal competition for this part of the continent that has its origins with the creation of nation-states in South-Eastern Europe, especially with the creation of Yugoslavia [1918].
The return of geopolitics in the Balkans
The voluntary failure of the EU on May 17, 2024 can also be interpreted as an ominous warning of new clashes, which proves that the Balkans can easily become an “experimental laboratory” for European-Russian relations after the end of the war. in Ukraine.
The possible re-election of Donald Trump on November 2 again to the post of American president is expected to have consequences for the global order system, as much as the war in Ukraine and its consequences have meanwhile. Most observers agree with this finding. However, it is unclear how this will reflect in particular regions of the world. As far as the Balkans are concerned, already in the first campaign when Trump was running for the presidency [2016], observers rightly pointed out that two data from Trump’s foreign policy “program” are of importance particular: avowed isolationism, i.e. extensive restraint in international affairs and apparent attempt to improve relations with Moscow through a “male friendship” with President Vladimir Putin.[6]
For Dr. Winfried Veit: however, the “Albanian issue” is not the only unresolved problem in the Balkans that has explosive potential. According to him, it is also the “Serbian issue”, which through the threats coming from Banjalluka, the capital of the “Republika Srpska” returns to the scene. There, but also in Belgrade, the warning that in the UN soon [on May 23], the resolution sponsored by Germany and Rwanda on the Serbian genocide in Srebrenica and in general in Bosnia during the Serbian aggression, will be presented for approval, has brought back the scapegoats. of war. Those culprits have already been installed within the new Serbian government, as a byproduct of the elections of December 17 of the year we left behind. The same players in the “Great Game” are again in the background: Russia is on the side of the Serbs, whose national flag flies at rallies, while the US has so far supported the Bosnian central government in Sarajevo, which categorically rejects any idea of detachment. Meanwhile, the president of China also landed in Belgrade to witness the return of geopolitics more forcefully.
Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Belgrade on the evening of May 7 for a two-day visit to try to increase Beijing’s influence in Europe’s political and economic affairs.[7] Speaking about Chinese-Serbian friendship, he did not forget to emphasize China’s position on Kosovo. “China supports Serbia’s efforts to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity, for the issue of Kosovo”, [8] the Chinese president said on this occasion in a press conference.
In this visit, parallels between Taiwan and Kosovo were not coincidentally raised.
The two subsequent visits of DASH senior officials to Kosovo seem to give the proper answer not only to Xi Jinping, but also to official Belgrade.
***
In this race to prove that the Balkans continues to be a sphere of national interest, not even France has stood idly by. Paris, however, continues to be concerned about Russia’s growing influence in the Balkans, especially through Serbia and the Serbian communities in the region. Consequently, it would be expected that France would work to counter this influence through its own policies and cooperation with European partners and NATO. Avoiding even in the public debate the conditioning of Serbia with the recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, as a precondition for moving towards the EU and by imposing the so-called trick of DE FACTO RECOGNITION as a substitute for DE JURE RECOGNITION, this return to the Balkans is claimed make it easier. Also, she went on to describe the Brussels Agreement [February 2024] and its Annex [March 2024] as valid, despite the Serbian refusal to sign it and even silently passing over its nullification [see the letter of the former Serbian prime minister of 15 December 2023], France is insisting on promoting its national interests, quietly supporting Belgrade in its project that is now known by the euphemistic political notion “Serbian World”.
Another geopolitical interest for France is managing the growing influence of Turkey and China in the Balkans. The economic investment and cultural presence of these countries are important, and France seeks to balance this influence to maintain a harmonized European approach.
***
In the Balkans, Turkey has been claiming to return as a major player for a long time.
Ankara sees itself as a protective power for Muslims in the Balkans, and after President Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy failed miserably in Central Asia and the Middle East, it is focusing on the Balkans.
In this competition, what position does the European Union take? Since the Thessaloniki summit [2003] it seems that Brussels has “excluded itself”, it does not have any inherent role. The pronounced absence of the EU has indirectly encouraged Montenegro to be more oriented towards Moscow (recently confirmed by the inauguration of a pro-Russian government). Let’s not talk about the total influence of Russia in Serbia.
The test that Serbia carried out with the aggression of September 24, 2023 and the arms race, as well as the concreteness of Serbia’s position next to Russia and China, likely to soon become a regular member of BREX, prove that the latent conflicts in the region are being warned more open. Then the question is rightly raised, how will the US behave in the future? The warning that Trump made when Montenegro joined NATO, before making public the famous statement that the USA would not enter the third world war for Montenegro, is a bad omen for the fate of the region. In case of an explosion provoked on a larger scale by Serbia, the USA always thinks that Trump would return to the White House, because the Serbian president, quite easily, may be able to stay away from the conflict.
Faced with the possible course of history, when Russia can also enter the game strongly, the EU seems to be reconsidering the possible scenarios for action after the Russian victory in Ukraine.
Therefore, there are increasing voices in political and academic circles who plead that the EU, in case the scenario of the possible withdrawal of America is realized, reach an agreement with Russia now about the responsibility they should have jointly in the Balkans and to prevent a situation like that in Ukraine.[9]
This behavior of the EU in relation to Kosovo on May 17, 2024 should be understood as an imposition of this strategy of rapprochement with Russia. In security circles in Austria, see for this, the Austrian model of neutrality is recently being discussed as a way out, which, when applied to Serbia, for example, could represent a compromise between European rapprochement while guaranteeing military neutrality. This compromise probably does not exclude in advance the Serbian idea of the “Serbian World” as a solution to the “Serbian issue”. This model, according to Dr. Winfried Vait, can be supplemented with the concept of a Europe of concentric circles, in which the Balkan states can be included in an outer ring without endangering Russian interests in the region. This would certainly be pure realpolitik, but it would be better than the idea of a confrontation like in Ukraine or even worse, [10] he concludes.
But, in addition to these academic circles that sell this version of the treatment of Kosovo in accordance with the approaches of the near future with Russia, representatives of the realist school judge that Ukraine cannot lose the war at all, not to the extent that the Perednimi continues to be engaged deep in its support. See for this, even Germany, hesitant at first, is now fully engaged, not hiding the bleeding for coordination in line with the growing awareness in the West on both sides of the Atlantic of the need for Russia, for all its size, to lose the war against Ukraine .
Now that both sides in the fight are clear that the end of this war will not be decided in the fields and steppes of Donbass, but in the waves of the Black Sea. [11] See for this, military experts rightly judge that only when Russian warships positioned in distant ports in the Black Sea will they face Ukrainian long-range weapons after they have breached the Kerch bridge in Crimea in three parts, only then will Russia no longer be able to resupply its troops throughout the Crimean peninsula.
Meanwhile, the West has approved entire packages for the completion of Ukraine with modern weapons and ammunition. In addition to this open readiness, the West is calibrating these shipments precisely so that neither side can win or lose this war.[12] Does this mean that the allies are hiding the fact that they are not sure about the victory of Ukraine?
A similar game seems to have been played by the EU in the case of avoiding the agenda for Kosovo’s accession to the Council of Europe. Paris and Rome in particular, want neither the Serbian side nor the Kosovar side to appear victorious in this battle, least of all the Kosovar side. The goal seems to be that, after the end of the elections for the European Parliament, everything will return to its course, even restoring the dignity of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and all its mechanisms that had paved the way for the formal vote. of Kosovo’s accession to the Council of Europe in accordance with the practice applied so far in this area.
The decision of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in the report on the status of Kosovo in this organization seems to warn of a clear step for possible walking on this path.
In Sofia, Bulgaria, for three consecutive days [May 25, 26 and 27], the work of the meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly took place. Kosovo was also on the agenda of this meeting, namely the advancement of its status from an observer member to an associate member.
Unlike the ministerial meeting of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly voted in favor of advancing Kosovo’s status in this security mechanism. [13]
What are Germany’s interests in the region?
The German author Christian Hacke mentions the following factors to determine this: The geographical and geopolitical situation in the middle of Europe, the past, the attitude of foreign policy partners and neighbors, global political developments and the values of the basic law.[13]
In addition, these national interests are also based on foreign policy values that take into consideration the obligations provided by the constitution, respectively the Basic Law, as the Germans call it, which obliges politics to: maintain international peace in the form of the prohibition of war aggression (Article 26 of the LTH), cooperative internationalism through the possibility of transferring sovereign state rights to interstate institutions (Article 24 of the LTH), the preservation and realization of human rights (Article 1 paragraph 2 of the LTH) and the primacy of international law ( article 25 LTH).[14]
Since 2001 the German Federal Government has provided regular annual reports to the Federal German Parliament “on their results and efforts to further develop the general political and economic strategy for the Balkan states and the whole of South-Eastern Europe.” In these reports, Kosovo and the Albanian issue in general have a meritorious place.
In the professional literature that sheds light on the German policy for Kosovo, researcher Rafael Biermann has a significant role. With his voluminous book [664 pages] with the significant title “Years of practice in Kosovo – The failure of international crisis prevention”[15] he actually presents an empirical-analytical study of (failed) crisis prevention in Kosovo, in which he investigates the causes of the lack of prevention by the international community before the outbreak of war. Of course, Biermann also deals with German politics in Kosovo, but here he presents only one of several aspects of the international network of relations in the Balkans. According to Biermann, the international policy, and thus the German one in relation to Kosovo, was characterized by its “abstinence” from 1989 to 1991. The suspension of autonomy by Milosevic passed in complete silence, being tolerated and treated simply as an internal matter of Serbia! Even after that, during almost the entire decade of apartheid [1989-1999], Kosovo was not an issue. “Governments and parliament were largely concentrated in Bosnia until 1998.”[16]
Only in the summer of 1998, when the KLA will appear on the scene, the Kosovo crisis received international attention, including the German side.
The fighting of the KLA guerilla units during 1997 caused German politics to face the conflict as well. But even then, the federal government did this mainly in coordination with partners, that is, mainly within the framework of the Contact Group that worked for the Balkans, within the framework of the Common Foreign Policy of the EU and increasingly within NATO- s. Similar to what Chancellor Olaf Scholz did this time, on the eve of the ministerial meeting of the Council of Ministers on May 17, 2024, even on the eve of the outbreak of war in Kosovo, the government of the charismatic Chancellor Helmut Kohl would try to do his best to avoided the impression that Germany was acting alone.
In a political essay of no more than 21 pages, entitled “Deutschland und die Kosovo-Krise” [Germany and the Kosovo crisis] published in 2000,[17] authored by Joachim Krause, he brought us a string of arguments about the real reasons for German commitment in that way. German intervention in the world was nevertheless of a multidimensional nature even in the international context of the time. Krause clearly shows the tension between German, European and international politics, which seems to be returning to the scene again.
Not without real political reasons, academician Mehmet Kraja describes the first five years of the last decade of the 20th century as “lost years”. Meanwhile, the following years, until the appearance of the KLA, can go down in history, not only as a continuation of the first five years, i.e. as lost years, but even worse – a kind of reconciliation with the life of the “pig satisfied”. The entire politics of the LDK and the so-called Kosovar Alternative in the world, had degenerated into a kind of “aesthetic rejection” of the life of the suffering Socrates”!
Another book of great interest to shed light on German policy in relation to Kosovo is Roland Friedrich’s – “Die deutsche Außenpolitik im Kosovo-Konflikt” published in 2005.
In this study, we will pay attention to how, not only the German policy, but also that of the EU, in relation to Kosovo, was completely “confused”. However, it is of interest to emphasize that, for the author, the outbreak of the war in Kosovo from 1998, represents a “perhaps decisive step in the process” towards an “active German role in the management of international conflicts”.[18]
According to this researcher, the war that broke out in Kosovo in 1998 was the “hot spot” for German foreign and security policy in the late 1990s.
The same conclusion can probably be drawn even now with the failure of the dialogue process and the so-called Franco-German plan.
As in the first case, even now, with the turn imposed by the loss of the geopolitical battle of the EU in relation to Kosovo, Serbia “handed over” to you on May 17, 2024, a return of German policy will be imposed to overcome this crisis, both in terms of its aims in Southeast Europe in the face of Russian and Turkish geopolitical interests, as well as in its multilateral approach. For Roland Friedrich, the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo in 1999 represented a “paradigm shift”. I believe that a paradigm shift in German policy will soon be announced through the commitment of the current government to change the course of the EU in relation to the interests of the EU in the region and towards Kosovo and the Albanians in particular.
Let’s remember the fact that, through military activities and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, as much as through its contribution to the process of profound changes in the political scene in Kosovo on the eve of the “silent democratic revolution”, as I call it elections on February 14, 2021, Germany transformed from a “reactive actor” to a “political shaping force” in Kosovo and the region.
But in the case in question, i.e. in the case of avoiding the agenda for Kosovo’s accession to the Council of Europe, “the national interests of Kosovo and those of Germany, as if submitted to the so-called European interests, which are actually Russian interests!” Therefore, this geopolitical battle is lost by both Germany and the EU.
In this case, if we were to express ourselves according to Karl Kaiser’s paradigm, it is “European interests that are at stake today in the foreground, and it remains to be determined only when German interests are not in harmony with the interests of the EU.”[19 ]
The creation of the Serbian Republic 2.0 in Kosovo, which means a kind of federalization of it as an intermediate stage leading to the annexation of northern Serbia, however, contradicts the national interests of Kosovo; as an act, it seriously harms the vital interest of the Albanians as a nation, but it is also completely inconsistent with the EU’s own political philosophy. See for this, the voluntary failure of the EU in relation to Kosovo for the second time, now with the issue of the Council of Europe, imposes a complete reconsideration of the entire process of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue mediated for more than a decade by of the EU.
Conclusion
For a long time, the issue of Kosovo was not an issue of European politics, and therefore not even of German politics. This entered the political agenda of the EU and Germany when the KLA appeared in Kosovo, while the issue of Kosovo’s status became a topic only in 2003 as part of the Balkan Contact Group.
If, during the last years, Germany at the European and international level, showed greater commitment in relation to Kosovo, becoming an advocate of its interests, crowning this relevant influence on Western politics in several consecutive processes, in this case, also it became a party to voluntary failure in the geopolitical confrontation with Russia.
In the EU, with emphasis in France and Iali, they do not have many dilemmas why Kosovo continues to be very interested in joining the Council of Europe: the first and fundamental goal is to sue Serbia before the court in Strasbourg for war reparations. See for this, they judge in Belgrade, Kurti’s government has determined the date June 12, 1999 as the last date for reparations and war crimes. According to the Serbian analyst, Zeljko Pantelić, Kurti in this way wants to prepare the ground for the lawsuit and new information that will support it.[20]
With the tough stance towards Kosovo, insisting on imposing the Community of Serbian Municipalities as a construct that will defunctionalize the Republic, on the way to the annexation of northern Serbia, the West is running the risk of creating the impression that it is insisting on applying unequal standards, which have geopolitical interests.
Similarly, like the adoption of the Resolution on genocide at the UN sponsored by Germany and Rwanda, and the expected lawsuit from Kosovo against Serbia, they judge not only in Belgrade, will serve as new sparks to the fire for the destabilization of the region.
See for this, the region of Southeast Europe in general and Kosovo in particular, remain a test case for the new role of Germany in international relations and with emphasis in the shaping of the New European Order. Consequently, the accession of Kosovo to the Council of Europe in the following months, but first of all the preservation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo and the accelerated prosperity of its integration into NATO, will be the test of Germany’s policy for Kosovo, and therefore the EU, where the new German alias European foreign policy takes shape and content, which is not and cannot be the beginning of the Europeanization of the foreign policy of modern Germany.
The German experience in its journey towards reunification and gradual approach in the field of sovereign thought and action, see for this, serves Kosovo a lot, which has become sovereign in full accordance with international law.
Serbia was present for 87 years in Kosovo as a colonizer. With the composition of the new government, it strongly returns to the expansive colonial mindset. Consequently, it seems to remain far from its expected transformation from the EU. The further imposition of the Power-Church-Army triangle, connected by a thousand and one threads to the Kremlin, nullifies the illusions of any expected positive change. On the contrary, the transformation of this government into a war cabinet should be the most realistic scenario possible. This process that is happening before our eyes should be an alarm of its own kind for the citizens of Serbia and Southeast Europe, but also for those of the EU.
Footnotes
1. Wellershoff, Dieter: Interessen in der internationalen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, in: Theiler, Olaf (Hrsg.): Deutsche Interessen in der sicherheitspolitischen Kommunikation, Schriften der Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation, Band 24, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2001, p. 123
2. Reinhold Niebuhr (Moral Man and Immoral Society, 1932) and Hans Joachim Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948) who emigrated from Germany to the USA are considered the founders of classical realism.
3. Little, Richard / Smith, Michael (Hrsg): The politics of power and security – Introduction, in: Perspectives on World Politics, 2. Auflage, Routledge, London/New York, 1991, p. 6.
4. https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/asambleja-parlamentare-e-ke-se-miraton-raportin-e-dik-martit-per-kosoven-114585134/457215.html
5. https://repository.scp-ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e98039bda9&doc_type=stl_filing&lang=eng
6. Dr. Winfried Veit: https://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/europa/artikel/die-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik-auf-dem-balkan-1764/
7. https://www.evropaelire.org/a/xi-jinping-mberrin-ne-beograd-vizite/32937816.html
8. https://lajme.rtsh.al/artikull/serbia-kandidate-per-ne-be-nenshkruan-29-marreveshje-me-kinen-per-te-ardhmen-e-perbashket-
9. Dr. Winfried Veit: https://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/europa/artikel/die-rueckkehr-der-geopolitik-auf-dem-balkan-1764/
10. Ibd
11. Profesor Dr Alexander Etkind: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/niederlage-russlands-ist-kein-grund-zur-angst-sondern-zur-hoffnung-ld.1828900
12. Ibd
13. Hacke, 1996, p. 5.
14. See more on this: German Foreign Policy, in: Jäger, Thomas / Höse, Alexander / Oppermann, Kai (eds.): German Foreign Policy, Security, Welfare, Institutions and Norms, VS Publishing House for Social Sciences, Wiesbaden, 2007, p. 13-39.
15. Biermann, Rafael: Lehrjahre im Kosovo – Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention, Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn, 2006.
16. Biermann, 2006, p. 583.
17. https://d-nb.info/1191645908/34
18. Friedrich, 2006, p. 9
19. Cituar sipas Albrecht-it, 2001, p. 117
20. Željko Pantelić: https://velikeprice.com/politika/dosije-balkan-kako-je-kurti-vratio-loptu-na-centar/?fbclid=IwAR3FXExLc52k7OrbtApSvTsv3V7p81w6CCHHIG8lL1Z0GMWf6OMOgeNpMJg_aem_AW1k3N6p9CDjKzV2S4rkUbZ2QH1wmZcNRveAiGb0RXhYH8EyZPn78tWK_Mo-pgNtA8FRHXX95cOMrm_aLR7oo46J&utm_medium=paid&utm_source=fb&utm_id=120208278488070261&utm_content=120209003260070261&utm_term=120209003260060261&utm_campaign=120208278488070261
